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Abstract: This paper discusses in way in which partisan influence upon public policy, 
and wider historical, political and institutional pressures, can operate on a regional 
level and can lead to divergent policies existing within a nation-state.  It offers an 
empirical discussion of two policy areas (education and childcare) at the regional 
Level (the level of the Länder) in Germany, confirming that both the partisan 
composition of regional government, and also wider institutional and historical 
pressures, exert a clear influence upon policy, lead to sharply variations in policy 
within the nation state.  Two conclusions can be drawn: that the region cab be an 
important unit of analysis in Political Science and Public Policy, and that scholars of 
policy change may find the regional level fertile ground in analysing wider political 
phenomena.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
As Jeffery has persuasively argued, German political science needs to take the 
regional level seriously, with this particularly applying to federalism research (Jeffery 
2011). As a starting point, this paper agrees with Jeffery’s claim but contends that 
the potential impact of political decentralisation has been neglected more widely in 
scholarship in Political Science and Public Policy.  It also argues that, akin to the 
neglect of territorial dimensions in public policy, the importance more generally of 
political parties at the sub-national level has not had the attention that it should.  For 
federal states with democratic elections, these represent substantial ‘blind spots’.  
The remainder of this introduction sets out these claims, which the rest of the paper 
illustrates with reference to the German Länder. 
 
Jeffery contends that a ‘methodological nationalism’ (ibid.) in Political Science has 
not been fully overcome (and that in this respect, politics contrasts with more 
promising directions being pursued in human geography and regional economics); 
there was, he claims, a perception, particularly within accounts of modernisation, that 
in western Europe the nation state was inexorably growing in importance (Jeffery / 
Wincott 2010, p. 167).  Moreover, recent challenges to this ‘methodological 
nationalism’ have tended to focus upon the supranational level, with ‘oceans of ink 
[being] spilt on the challenges that globalization and European integration pose to 
Europe’s nation states’ (ibid. p. 167).  Neither claims of the importance of the nation 
state, nor a focus on the supranational level, is incorrect per se, but both can lead to 
a neglect of politics below the level of the nation state (what Jeffery and Wincott call 
‘sub-state territorial politics’). 
 
In particular, according to Jeffery, the literature on German federalism has often 
focused upon the level of the nation state, rather than the level of the individual 
Länder (Jeffery 2011, p.8).  Such an analysis has brought important insights – for 
2 
 
instance, on the role and function of political parties within the federal system 
(Lehmbruch 2000) or on the difficulty of achieving changes to institutional rules 
(Scharpf 1988), but it has delivered an incomplete and rather misleading picture, 
which suggests a greater degree of territorial cohesion than in fact exists in modern-
day, post-reunification Germany. 
 
This point about Germany can certainly be applied more broadly within Political 
Science.  For instance, Jeffery and Wincott (2010, pp. 178-86) suggest that the sub-
national level could usefully be integrated more fully into work on regional elections 
and on welfare states, although this process has already begun (and indeed has 
some tradition within scholarship focused upon the United States). 
 
Elsewhere, this author has argued that the substantial literature about the level of 
partisan influence upon public policy – the do-parties-matter? debate – has 
substantially neglected the sub-national level (Turner 2011).  Seminal contributions 
to this debate (Hibbs 1977, Castles and McKinlay 1979, Castles 1982, Garrett and 
Lange 1986, 1991, Hicks and Swank 1992) all focused, in various ways, on the 
nation state level.  This was in part the product of a particular assumption that the 
most important manifestation of partisan difference in public policy was in the area of 
socio-economic policy, and in particular in levels of taxation and state expenditure, 
with higher levels of taxing and spending associated with governments of the left 
than with governments of the right. Even in states with a high level of 
decentralisation, decisions on macro-economic policy are likely to be focused at the 
national level, and so such a stance is appropriate.  Later important contributions to 
the debate (Garrett 1998, Boix 1998) returned to the question within a slightly 
different conceptual framework, questioning the extent to which partisan 
distinctiveness in national-level macroeconomic policy remained viable, particularly, , 
in circumstances of increased interdependence. 
 
Alongside the assumption that the key area of partisan difference is that of fiscal 
policy, there is a methodological assumption that the impact of political parties upon 
public policy is best assessed deploying quantitative analysis of large, cross-national 
datasets covering a significant time-period.  However, both assumptions might be 
challenged.  For instance, as sections 2 and 4 of this paper will go on to discuss, the 
areas of education and childcare policy have been the subject of disagreement 
between political parties in the German context (and there is no reason to believe 
Germany to be unique in this regard); the same could equally be said of, for 
instance, policy on internal security and civil liberties, the environment, the 
relationship between states and organised religion, or on such questions of ‘morality’ 
as abortion, assisted dying, or rules around organ transplants.   This, in turn, could 
lead to a challenge to the dominant method of analysis: although quantitative studies 
of such questions are possible (for instance, by coding policy positions), data is less 
readily available, and differences between standpoints are perhaps less easily 
captured: they will, in any event, have little to do with levels of government 
expenditure.  Governments might also engage in market-shaping behaviour: this can 
lead to reduced levels of government expenditure while enhancing the financial 
position (for instance in the case of welfare payments) of individuals. 
 
In any event, though, if analysis of the impact of political parties upon public policy is 
extended beyond core questions of macro-economic policy, then, in circumstances 
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when more and more power is devolved to sub-national governments (Marks et al 
2008) and jurisdiction over important areas of public policy is passed to the sub-
national level, a shift in the unit of analysis away from that of the nation state 
becomes essential.  To illustrate this point: in carefully researched study into 
determinants of levels of childcare (which concludes that the partisan composition of 
government, as well as levels of female employment and descriptive representation 
in legislatures, are important factors), Bonoli and Reber (2010) look at the national 
level, measuring participation of children in state childcare from ages 0-3.  Within 
Germany, this proportion varies from 14% in North-Rhine Westphalia to 55.9% in 
Saxony-Anhalt; the west German average, excluding Berlin, is 17.3%, while the 
eastern average, again excluding Berlin, is 48% (Statistische Ämter 2011, p. 6).  This 
is not to suggest that Bonoli and Reber’s conclusions are wrong, but it suggests that 
digging deeper than the national level might well strengthen the findings. 
 
Of course, the partisan composition of a government, whether at the national or sub-
national level, is by no means the only determinant of public policy.  Amongst a 
multitude of other factors, the history of a polity (e.g. Skocpol 1992), the nature of 
political institutions (Lijphardt 1999), the nature of the society (Castles 1998) or of the 
economy (Hall / Soskice 2001) as well as the factors associated with political 
leadership or ideology (Schmidt 2002) can all exert an important influence upon the 
development of public policies.  In circumstances of decentralised policy-making, 
and indeed in nation-states which encompass a diversity of regions, these factors 
can apply just as well to the sub-national as to the national level.  Moreover, as 
behavioural economists (Arthur 1989) and subsequently political scientists (Pierson 
2000) have argued, ‘path dependence’ may well lead to the lock-in of particular 
trajectories of policy development: regional differences in public policies might, then, 
become entrenched, either because of resistance to change at the level of political 
institutions, or within public opinion. 
 
In addition to these broader determinants of public policy operating at the sub-
national level, the very fact that policy-making is decentralised may, in some cases, 
have a substantive impact upon policies.  Such a prospect has been outlined in the 
case of welfare policy, albeit with mixed results: If Hicks and Swank (1992) found 
that the existence of federalism tempered welfare state development, more recent 
work (Obinger et al 2005) find the evidence rather more mixed, pointing to the ways 
in which federalism can hinder welfare retrenchment (both by creating additional 
veto-points which may block potential cuts, and in leading to more elections, making 
politicians more fearful of the electoral price of cut-backs).  In the North American 
context, the possibility of federalism leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ (Peterson 1995, 
Harrison 2006) has been highlighted, with regions gaining a competitive advantage 
through reducing levels of state expenditure and taxation; while with reference to the 
UK, Keating (2010) finds support for the view that electoral pressures resulting from 
decentralisation may actually lead to upward increases in the levels of welfare 
provision. 
 
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the consideration of two questions: first, 
the impact of political parties upon public policy at the regional level in Germany.  
With some important exceptions (Schmidt 1980; Wolf / Hildebrandt 2008; Payk 2009) 
there has been a surprising paucity of attention to the interplay between political 
parties and public policy at the sub-national level.  Secondly, the paper considers the 
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existence of specific territorial effects at the regional level, such that policies differ 
within the nation state, as factors shaping public policy are played out at the regional 
level.  To this end, two areas of policy are analysed: policy towards schools, and 
childcare policy.  In the case of education, policy is predominantly the preserve of the 
Land governments (notwithstanding some voluntary horizontal co-ordination through 
the conference of education ministers, the KMK).  In the case of childcare policy, 
responsibility is shared between the federal, Land and local tiers of government (Hill 
et al 2010). 
 
Using these cases, the paper attempts to assess and develop two claims: firstly, that 
political parties matter on a regional level, and so an exclusive focus upon the 
national level is mistaken; secondly, that a diversity of policies at a regional level can 
have its roots at that level, and that such diversity can be cemented at that level.  
The main body of research upon which this paper is founded was carried out by the 
author as part of a wider project examining changes of government in three Länder 
(cf. Turner 2011). 
 
 
2. Education Policy: Partisan variation 
 
There can be little doubt that political parties in Germany have widely different views 
of education policy (here, in respect of schools, although the same could also be 
said of higher education).  As Payk, in the introduction to an impressive study of 
partisan influence following the publication of the PISA study into educational 
attainment notes, ‘Previous research into schools policy demonstrates strong party 
political influence’ (Payk 2009, p. 3). 
 
Payk (ibid pp. 93-7, cf. also Stern 2000, pp. 124-8; Turner 2011, p. 62) notes several 
core areas where there have been particular party political differences in this area of 
policy.  The CDU is more supportive of selective education than is the SPD, and this 
is by far the strongest dividing line between the parties, with the CDU looking for 
selection to occur earlier in children’s education careers, according to criteria 
measured by teachers and tests, and the SPD resisting early selection, keen to 
promote flexibility between different educational pathways, and often being 
supportive of comprehensive schools.  But there are further areas of difference: for 
instance, the CDU has been more supportive of centralised examinations and the 
use of grading from an early age to signify performance, and has been keen on 
compulsory religious education.  The SPD has traditionally been keener on school 
support for all-day education, whereas the CDU has been resistant to challenges this 
might pose to the traditional family model and the parental role.  The different 
partisan approaches are summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 1: Partisan variations in views of education policy 
Social democratic paradigm Christian democratic paradigm 
Comprehensive education (or if 
unacceptable, late and flexible 
selection) 
Early and rigid selection, with limited 
movement between types of school 
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Any selection based on parental 
choice 
Selection based on tests / teacher 
assessment 
High level of individual teacher 
discretion over curriculum content 
and testing 
Centralised tests and examinations 
Abitur (university-qualifying 
examination for school leaders) after 
13 years 
Abitur after 12 years 
Extensive pupil choice of subject Limiting of pupil choice 
Compulsory, integrated all-day 
education 
Half-day education with possibility of 
extension 
Teachers provide education all-day Some supervision undertaken by 
volunteers / unqualified helpers 
Limited reliance on grading High reliance on grading 
Grading only in secondary school Grading from year 1 
No grading of behaviour and 
teamwork 
Grading of behaviour and teamwork 
Limited repetition of years in event of 
poor performance 
High level of repetition of  years in 
event of poor performance 
Free provision of school books Parental contribution towards school 
books 
Opposition to Länder having 
exclusive control over policy 
Support for Länder having complete 
control over policy 
Partnership with trade unions Limited involvement with unions 
Source: Adapted from Turner (2011) 
 
In some cases, partisan difference has eroded over time.  For instance, Rudloff 
(2008, p. 355) notes that all Länder have now introduced centralised Abitur after 12 
rather than 13 years, with only Rhineland-Palatinate holding against this trend, 
allowing schools to set their own examinations, and continuing with Abitur after 12.5 
years (see also Wolf 2008, p. 32).  There have also been, post-PISA, instruments to 
secure quality and the introduction of some ‘New Public Management’ tools, albeit 
with variations in the way they have been deployed (Rudloff 2008, pp. 341-2). 
 
However, there remain substantial differences which can be attributed to the partisan 
composition of the government.  Following Germany’s poor results in the PISA study, 
there was a renewed debate between the parties over attitudes towards selection, 
running along partisan lines, with Social Democrats noting that countries with 
comprehensive schools performed better on average, while Christian Democrats 
noted the reverse was true within Germany (Wolf 2008, p. 25).  Payk’s 
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comprehensive study of reactions to PISA finds that the area of selection confirms 
the paramount importance of partisan influence: ‘... On the dimension of selection it 
can be held that as before there are significant differences in the evaluation of 
integrated forms of education.  In particular, comprehensive schools continue to be 
rejected by the CDU’ (2009, p. 171). 
 
Numerous examples could be drawn upon to illustrate the way partisan actors put 
their policies into practice.  In Hesse, the scene of highly polarised views between 
the different parties on education policy, a CDU-led government under Roland Koch 
was elected in 1999, and re-elected in 2003 (winning an overall majority).  Over 
these two legislative terms, there were substantial shifts in education policy: curricula 
were centralised, Land-wide tests were introduced, a greater emphasis was placed 
upon grading and it was introduced from the second half of year 2 (i.e. for 7-year-
olds), the role of teachers in selection was strengthened, at the expense of parents, 
and compulsory elements of all-day education at primary level were swiftly rescinded 
(for a full discussion, cf. Turner 2011, pp. 90-107).  However, there are some 
caveats around the issue of selection as indicating strong partisan difference, which 
will be outlined in section 4. 
 
Looking at a different Bundesland, Saxony-Anhalt, where a CDU/FDP coalition 
replaced an SPD-led government (tolerated by the PDS) in 2002, a broadly 
comparable picture emerges.  In the ensuring four years, a range of reforms were 
introduced which were entirely consistent with expectations of a CDU government: 
selection became more rigid and was brought forward two years, the role of teachers 
in selection was strengthened, grading was introduced from the very first year of 
schooling, and parental contributions for schoolbooks were introduced (amongst 
other changes; cf. Turner 2011, pp. 178-91).   
 
From 2001, Berlin has been governed by a coalition of the SPD and the Left Party 
(previously PDS).  Although education policy has not exclusively shifted in the 
direction that table 1 might suggest (for instance, charges were introduced for school 
books in 2003; cf. Miller 2003), several important aspects testify to the profound 
influence of political parties.  In early 2010, the Land’s legislature agreed to a fusion 
of selective strands apart from the grammar schools into ‘integrated secondary 
schools’; these would decide the extent of ‘streaming’ according to ability, and at the 
end of year 10, all these integrated secondary schools would offer pupils the 
opportunity to do the Abitur, which would qualify them for university 
(Senatsverwaltung Berlin 2009).  Two further proposals were included and are worth 
mentioning here: a pilot project of the Gemeinschaftsschule (a fully-integrated 
comprehensive) was agreed in coalition negotiations in 2006, and introduced in the 
2008/9 school year; there are currently 17 such schools in the city.  Secondly, and 
even more controversially, in the case that a grammar school was over-subscribed, 
60% of pupils would be chosen by the school, 10% would be allocated to children 
who had pressing social reasons to be there (for instance, due to siblings at the 
school), and 30% would be decided by lottery out of all those who met the qualifying 
criteria (ibid.).  In this way, it was intended to achieve a mix of pupils from different 
backgrounds at grammar schools; this provision was the subject of hefty criticism 
from the opposition (Menke 2010). 
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Although Berlin’s plans are strikingly radical, a similar direction of policy change can 
be discerned in other Länder which have experienced a shift in government from 
right to left.  In Baden-Württemberg, the newly-elected Green-Red government has 
proposed merging the two lower tiers of school where there is public support, and 
also intends to end binding decisions on admission to grammar school by teachers, 
instead strengthening the role of parents (Burchard 2011).  In North-Rhine 
Westphalia, the government initially had similar intentions, albeit with a greater 
amount of local flexibility within the Land (Geiges / Leffers 2010); in the end, as will 
be outlined in section 3, even these quite modest plans came unstuck. 
 
In summary, then, scholarship looking at a wide range of cases (Wolf 2008, Payk 
2009), as well as detailed case-study research (Turner 2011) suggests that partisan 
influence upon education policy remains profound.  Reforms going in opposing 
directions can be found, leading to growing diversity in some aspects of Germany’s 
educational landscape, and some of these important differences are quite clearly 
attributable to the partisan colour of the Land government. 
 
One point that needs to be made at this juncture is that, with the growing complexity 
of Germany post-reunification, and (at least) six parties credibly able to compete for 
government office at the Land level (CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, and the Green and Left 
Parties), the direction of partisan influence upon policy may well become more 
complex (Jeffery 2005).  If coalitions occur across traditional left-right boundaries 
(such as grand coalitions, or those involving both CDU and Greens), then it is not 
obvious in which direction there will be partisan pressure for change (and indeed 
whether overall vote shares, or portfolio allocation in particular policy areas, will be 
decisive – for example, if the SPD holds the education ministry in a grand coalition in 
which it is very much the junior partner, it is not clear what might be expected).  
 
 
3. Education Policy: Territorially-founded variation 
 
Notwithstanding the differences in education policy that are clear from the previous 
section, there are also territorially-founded variations which can be discerned.  This 
section will demonstrate that flow in different ways from the context of the Land, be it 
in terms of the legal context, history, or the nature of the Land’s demography.  As a 
result, variations can become entrenched.  This section attempts to illustrate this with 
reference to a number of cases of education policy.  As section 2 discussed, the 
preferences of political parties in this area are both quite clearly defined and quite 
polarised, so if it can be shown that there are occasions when territory trumps party 
as a determinant of policy, even when the forces of party might be expected to be 
strong, this could be a significant finding. 
 
One feature of regional governance in Germany is the presence of a state 
constitution (Landesverfassung; cf. Freitag / Vatter 2008, pp. 221-36).  Although 
precise rules governing constitutional amendment vary, these always require some 
sort of ‘super-majority’ (typically a two-thirds majority of all MPs) in the legislature to 
secure agreement (ibid, p. 233).  Such rules can, therefore, entrench particular 
policies unless a ‘grand coalition’ in support of amendment is secured (given 
polarisation in the field of education policy between the CDU and SPD, it can safely 
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be assumed that the need for such a grand coalition would seriously temper partisan 
influence upon policy). 
 
One concrete example of this is that of the Saarland, led by the (then) SPD politician 
Oskar Lafontaine between 1985 and 1998, after the CDU had governed for the 
remainer of the post-war period.  It might have been expected that the Lafontaine 
governments would have pursued extensive reforms to the package of school 
structures: the SPD’s new party programme declared in 1989 (having been 
developed by a commission led by Lafontaine) in 1989 that ‘The comprehensive 
school is best suited to realise our education policy aims’ (SPD 1989).  Yet only one 
school reform took place during this period, with the two lower tiers of the traditional 
three-tier education system in the Saarland being merged, in the so-called ‘education 
compromise’ of 1996.  Lafontaine was only able to get CDU support for the 
constitutional amendment necessary to allow the merger of the two lower tiers of 
school if the existence of grammar schools was constitutionally guaranteed (cf. 
Turner 2011, pp. 133-4).  At the same time, the CDU government elected in 1999 
(and re-elected in 2004) would not have been able to abolish comprehensive 
schools, due to their constitutional anchorage. 
 
In North-Rhine Westphalia, Land-level legal obstacles obstructed the school reform 
proposed by the SPD-led (minority) government in 2010; the education minister 
there promoted the creation of ‘experimental’ comprehensive schools, only to see a 
local court stop the process, with the justification that the minister needed primary 
legislation in order to allow the creation of such schools; such legislation was unlikely 
to find a majority (Frigelj 2011).  As a response, the minister successfully sought a 
compromise with the CDU, which led to a constitutional amendment removing the 
lowest of three-tier schools and allowing their merger into comprehensives, but at the 
same time guaranteeing the existence of the grammar schools (taz 2011).  Again, 
this will impose a Land-level impediment to reforms which might be favoured by both 
the left (shifting towards comprehensive education) and the right (with extensions of 
selection).   
 
The entrenchment of a particular policy trajectory at a Land level can go beyond the 
constitutional.  There are several examples in the field of education policy where 
particular policies became politically entrenched at the Land level.  In the previous 
section, it was noted that the CDU-led government under Roland Koch appeared to 
have radically divergent views from its SPD predecessors and be extremely willing to 
put these into practice.  However, in the first period of the CDU-led government 
(between 1999 and 2004), the number of comprehensive schools dropped only 
slightly (from 217 to 213) and the number of children at them actually rose (from 
186,718 to 194,371). Although some actors attributed this to pragmatism and a 
concern with outputs rather than structures, others pointed to the popularity of 
existing comprehensive schools.  This situation might be compared to welfare state 
retrenchment.  Pierson (1996, p.145) notes that once welfare states are created, 
concentrated interests will emerge around them; these are more likely to engage in 
collective action to defend their position than diffuse interests, and are also more 
likely to be plugged into organisational networks which inform them about 
government policy and facilitate political action.  The same goes for comprehensive 
schools in Hesse: once created, and assuming the schools have a modicum of 
popularity, teachers and parents will have a stake in their continuation. These actors 
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are also far more likely to be able to engage in action to defend the position of 
comprehensive schools than would ever have been able to promote their creation, 
and are also likely to be part of networks (such as parents’ or teachers’ associations) 
who support these policy goals.  The case of Hesse’s comprehensive schools 
appears to support the notion of Land-level path dependence.  A similar argument 
could be used to account for the persistence of free school books in Hesse, in spite 
of the fiscal and education policy conservatism of the governing CDU there. 
 
A similar phenomenon can be seen, in reverse, in the case of Hamburg.  From 2008 
until 2011, Hamburg was governed by Germany’s first CDU/Green coalition.  One of 
the points in the coalition agreement (included at the Greens’ instigation but agreed 
to by the avowedly centrist Hamburg CDU under Ole von Beust) included the 
extension of non-selective education from year 4 to year 6; a suggestion which also 
gained the support of Hamburg’s SPD and was passed unanimously by the 
Hamburg parliament.  The government’s proposal encountered stiff resistance: an 
energetic campaign was founded (under a lawyer, Dr. Walter Scheuerl), with the 
support of conservative teachers’ associations and, in particular, parents of children 
who were at, or aspired to attend, grammar school (who were anxious that the 
shortened time in selective education would prove damaging to the children’s 
prospects).  The campaign garnered sufficient signatures to prompt a referendum on 
the proposals, and they were resoundingly defeated (Spiegel 2011).  The 
government’s defeat on the issue appeared to precipitate the resignation of the 
mayor of Hamburg, Ole von Beust, the collapse of the CDU/Green coalition and then  
new elections (when the CDU even adopted Dr. Scheuerl as a candidate, in an 
attempt to make good the damage the proposed reform had done to its core vote). 
 
The Hamburg case again provides a good example of Land-level path dependence, 
illustrating the way in which Land-level public opinion and political institutions can 
combine to thwart policies for which there is party political support.   
 
There are other ways in which the specific character of a Land may shape policy. 
Payk (2009, p. 163) notes that the in the post-reunification period, the CDU in the 
eastern Länder was supportive of combining the two lowest tiers of education (which 
existed alongside grammar schools); this is attributed to the tradition of combined 
school forms in the GDR, which led to a scepticism in the population about the 
lowest tier of school, along with public support for grammar schools.  Later, this 
amalgamation proved functionally useful, as depopulation (and falling birth-rates) in 
the east set in: smaller and shrinking communities might be able to support a 
combined secondary modern school, but would not have managed to support 
schools of both lower tiers. 
 
A completely different example of this phenomenon concerns the nature of relations 
between teacher’s trade unions (and specifically the left-wing GEW) and the CDU 
government.  As was mentioned in section 2, warm partnership between the CDU 
and such unions would not normally be expected.  Yet in the Saarland, throughout 
the period of CDU-led government from 1999-2009, the Chair of the GEW’s 
organisation in the Land chaired the education ministry’s personnel committee for 
comprehensive schools, taking important staffing decisions (Turner 2011, p. 140); 
interestingly, the individual in question later became Education Minister in the 
CDU/Green/FDP government.  The involvement of unions in operational matters by 
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a CDU-led government in, for instance, Hesse, would be close to unthinkable, and it 
probably reflects the small size of the Saarland, with politics characterised by a 
dense web of personal connections and relationships (when conducting interviews 
with policy actors there, numerous participants referred to the Saarland as the ‘Land 
of short paths’; cf. Turner 2011, p. 163).   
 
It is worth noting, too, that the programmatic orientation of German political parties is 
not consistent between the Länder, although there is a common thread (cf. Müller 
2009).  Rather, this can reflect whether the party is in government or opposition in 
the Land (and indeed its chances of entering government more broadly), and also 
the character of the Land (Detterbeck / Jeffery 2008, p.52).  To take three examples: 
in opposition the SPD in Hesse was a strong proponent of compulsory elements of 
all-day schooling, whereas, as Rüdloff (2008, p. 355) notes, the SPD education 
minister in Schleswig-Holstein said such schools were ‘expensive and not affordable 
at the present time’.  In the Saarland, the SPD opposition supported the Christian 
Democratic government’s proposal to ban headscarves in schools, in contrast to the 
stance taken by the SPD elsewhere; this probably reflects the catholicism of the 
Länder (Turner 2011, p.138; for a full discussion, Von Blumenthal 2009).  In Bavaria, 
notwithstanding the structural conservatism of the Land that had led to the CSU 
coming close to electoral hegemony in the post-war period, the SPD cheerfully 
proposed the introduction of non-selective community schools, offering all-day 
education, which should eventually replace existing, selective forms of school (SPD 
Landtagsfraktion Bayern 2010); in this case, it would seem the SPD was such a long 
way from power that its proposals reflected the opinion of party members and 
supporters rather than hard political calculations.  In sum, then, partisan influences 
upon policy are not exogenous to the wider characters of the Land (this point can be 
observed in the case of childcare policy also, as discussed in section 5 below). 
 
This section has illustrated ways in which the character of a Land can shape 
education policy; it has also demonstrated that Land-level political institutions, public 
opinion or a combination of both can entrench particular policy paths at the Land 
level.  This lends further support to Jeffery’s claim, discussed in section one, that 
individual Länder can be a relevant unit of analysis for political scientists seeking to 
understand policy. 
 
4. Childcare policy: Partisan variation 
 
For much of the post-war period, the partisan preferences of CDU/CSU and SPD 
reflected significant differences over the role and form of women and of the family in 
society, and the way in which children should be raised.  As Hagemann (2006, p. 
235) argues, ‘The chief opponents of the expansion of childcare and all-day schools 
in West Germany were the Catholic Church, the CDU, the CSU, and conservative 
Christian interest groups … [They] continued to argue that such a policy would 
alienate children from the family and threaten the very substance of its child-rearing 
potential’.  Although the SPD was not always a strong proponent of expanded 
childcare, by the time of its Berlin programme of 1989 extensive programmatic 
commitments could be seen, whereas the CDU’s 1994 programme contained strong 
commitments to the value of marriage and the equal value of family and paid work 
(cf. Grasnick 2007; Turner 2011, pp. 66-8).   
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When it comes to childcare policy, three broad tendencies can be discerned in the 
programmatic orientation of Christian Democrats, compared to Social Democrats 
(ibid. pp. 66-8): 
 
• A preference for institutional childcare starting later in life, for instance at 
around age three, rather than earlier in children’s lives; 
• Support for more flexible provision of childcare with lighter-touch regulation; 
• Equal value being attached to parents taking upon caring and professional 
responsibilities, with a consequent rejection, as discussed above, of education 
structures which would undermine this (such as compulsory all-day primary 
education). 
 
Taken at face value, this would then lead the observer to expect significant diversity 
in terms of childcare policy between and indeed within Bundesländer (remembering, 
following Hill et al 2010, that local authorities as well as Länder have a significant 
policy role in this area), and that this diversity would be related to political parties’ 
influence. 
 
In fact, the picture is significantly less clear-cut.  First, there has undoubtedly been a 
shift in the CDU’s programmatic orientation in this area of policy in recent years.  The 
most recent party programme of 2007 modernised its definition of family ‘Family is 
everywhere where parents take lasting responsibility for children, and children for 
parents’ (CDU 2007, p.25); it also stated that ‘The decision for marriage, children 
and family is a personal decision which we support; but state and society should not 
dictate to people how they live their lives’ (p. 26).  On childcare policy, it stated that 
‘Compatibility of family and professional life is a core component of Christian 
Democratic politics’ (p. 22).  In practice, this modernisation reflected policy change at 
a regional and national level which had already happened. 
 
To take a couple of examples, in the periods of Christian Democratic government in 
Hesse between 1999 and 2003, and in the Saarland between 1999 and 2004, there 
was an increase in state childcare provision.  In the Saarland, moreover, the final 
year of pre-school education was made free of charge (cf. Turner 2011, p. 221).  
Interviews with relevant actors there suggested that this was the result of the 
exercise of political leadership, recognising the changed nature of society, and 
occurred in spite of some scepticism on the part of grassroots party members (ibid, 
p. 113).  In Saxony-Anhalt, another case discussed above, although there was some 
retrenchment of provision, the CDU-led government left intact one of the most 
generous levels of  provision in Germany (ibid, p.204).  This change mirrors 
developments in the CDU’s policies on a federal level, with the Federal Minister for 
Family Affairs, Ursula von der Leyen, achieving a modernisation of the CDU’s view 
of the family, adopting a concept of family support derived from Sweden, and 
achieving a ‘transformation’ of policy (Schroeder / Neumann 2010, pp. 278-9); 
indeed, Schroeder and Neumann consider this a case of ‘contagion from the left’, 
since ‘the CDU took over the programmatic orientation of a more left wing party (the 
SPD)’ (ibid, p. 279). 
 
Even with the change in the programmatic orientation of the CDU, however, partisan 
differences in this area of policy are not irrelevant.  There remain differences 
between the parties on the optimal level of regulation and flexibility of childcare 
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provision (with the CDU more supportive of childminders).  In Hesse between 1999 
and 2003, the government introduced modest expansion of support for this group, 
while reducing minimum standards in institutions through a new ‘Nursery Directive’ 
(Turner 2011, p. 114).  In Saxony-Anhalt between 2002 and 2006, similarly, there 
was an increase in the flexibility of childcare provision and a reduction in the level of 
regulation (ibid., pp. 199-204), with a strengthening of the role of childminders, to the 
concern of formal institutional childcare providers. 
 
Moreover, the discussion here has focused on the modernisation of the CDU’s 
childcare paradigm.  The CSU retains a more conservative focus in its party 
programme, with strong statements about the particular importance of marriage, the 
priority of rights and duties of parents over action by the state, the need for high-
quality childcare provision, and ‘real freedom of choice’ for parents whether to work 
or stay at home (CSU 2007, pp. 75-9).  Although the CSU has, as in other 
Bundesländer, extended childcare provision, it has retained some Land-level 
payments for parents who stay at home to look after young children 
(Landeserziehungsgeld), and has remained sceptical about extending entitlement to 
free childcare (Henry-Huthmacher / Hoffmann 2006, pp. 95-6; Merkur 2010).  The 
CSU has also been active in shaping policy on a federal level, in particular 
demanding support for parents who chose to care for their children full-time, as well 
as those who went out to work (Gerlach 2010, p.233). 
 
 
5. Childcare policy: Territorial variation 
 
The previous section argued that there has been significant, although by no means 
complete, convergence in the childcare policies of the CDU and SPD (rather less so 
in  the case of the CSU), although in the details of childcare policy, for instance 
around the level of regulation, there remain differences. 
 
This is not, however, to claim that there is homogeneity in the level of childcare 
provision within Germany: quite the reverse is true, with radical differences within 
regions, and also between different local authority areas.  As noted in the 
introductory section, there are particularly strong differences between levels of 
institutional childcare in eastern and western Germany: an average of 17.3% of 
children under 3 in western Germany were in institutional childcare in 2010, while 
this was true for 48% of children in the east (cf. Statistische Ämter 2011, p. 6).  For 
children aged between 3 and 6, the figures were 91.6%, as against 95.2% (ibid, p. 
7).  Within the two parts of Germany, there were still significant differences: 28.5% of 
children aged under 3 in Hamburg had a place in childcare institutions, while the 
same was true for just 14% of those in North-Rhine Westphalia. 
 
There are clear historical and structural reasons why childcare in eastern Germany 
should be so much more developed.  In the GDR, a high proportion of women were 
active in the labour market, and the state extended childcare availability accordingly 
(Gerlach 2010). 
 
Women’s employment levels in eastern Germany are still higher than those in the 
west (all eastern Länder, excluding Berlin, were above the west German average in 
2007).  At the same time, no eastern Land had a level of women’s employment over 
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60%, and the proportion of women with children aged under three who were active in 
the labour market was only slightly higher than those in the west (cf. BMFSFJ 2010, 
pp. 44-8), in part due to the lesser availability of work.  As a result, the structure of 
the labour market in eastern Germany goes some way – but only some way – 
towards explaining the far greater level of institutional childcare provision there. 
 
Additionally, it can be hypothesised that a history of more generous provision in the 
eastern Länder feeds into this.  As was demonstrated in the case of education policy 
in section 3, path dependence can emerge on a regional level.  This can work 
through public expectations: the electorate in eastern Germany would have higher 
expectations for the provision of institutional childcare than in the west.  It would also 
be reflected in the political process, where cutbacks in this area (as in other areas of 
welfare policy; cf. Pierson 1996), could prove electorally costly.  Recent research 
(Bauer / Dähner 2010) has displayed enduring and significant differences between 
east and west in public opinion on issues to do with parenting, pointing at divergent 
expectations of the state: for instance, 37.4% of west German women declared they 
would be willing to stop working for their children, whereas the same view was 
expressed by just 16.3% of eastern women.  91.6% of eastern women saw their 
preferred life path to be a profession, with 8.4% preferring to stay at home (the 
figures were 81.3% as against 18.7% in the west).  Differences were not confined to 
women, either: 72.1% of eastern men agreed with the statement ‘My partner should 
have the same professional opportunities as me, therefore homework and childcare 
should be equally divided’, whereas 46.2% of western men expressed this view. 
 
Alongside this divergent opinion, just as in the case of comprehensive schools in the 
politically hostile climate of Hesse, discussed in section 3, alongside public support 
for existing arrangements, institutions can emerge to defend these at a Land level, 
and they can utilise Land-level political structures in their support.  The case of 
Saxony-Anhalt is instructive here (Turner 2011, pp. 196-200).  In 2002, the CDU-led 
government decided that the legal entitlement to full-day childcare for all children 
aged 0 to 6 should be cut back.  Initially, the proposal was to leave it in place for 
children aged between 3 and 6, while removing the entitlement for those aged under 
3 except where both parents were in work, or where there was a pressing social 
need.  After negotiation with the opposition SPD, the legal entitlement for children of 
all ages remained in place, but was reduced to half a day except where both parents 
were in work.  Even though this approach left Saxony-Anhalt with the most 
comprehensive legal entitlement to childcare in Germany, it was fiercely resisted by 
Land-level interest groups (such as those representing parents and childcare 
workers) as well as the opposition PDS, who managed to force a referendum on the 
issue (which was eventually lost, not meeting the legally-required level of turnout to 
overturn the government’s decision).  The government’s unusual strategy of seeking 
agreement with the opposition was not constitutionally necessary, but it brought 
some political advantage in trying to secure the politically-challenging, if modest, 
erosion of existing entitlements (ibid., pp. 200-5).   
 
In summary, as in the case of education policy, there appears to be every reason to 
take the level of the region as a relevant unit of analysis for childcare policy in 
Germany.  In particular, there are major variations in levels of provision across the 
country, which appear to relate to the varied regional contexts: political, but also 
historical, attitudinal and institutional.  These divisions are strongest along the fault-
14 
 
line between eastern and western Germany.  We can see, too, how the phenomenon 
of path dependence on a regional level can manifest itself, with the history and 
circumstances of a Land creating institutional blockages to retrenchment, raising the 
cost to politicians who seek to make cutbacks, and thus cementing regional diversity.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Even this brief survey of developments in just two areas of policy appears to confirm 
two claims outlined at the start of this article.  Firstly, the partisan composition of a 
government at the regional level in Germany can, at times, have a significant impact 
upon policy choices.  This will vary, of course, with the degree of control a Land has 
over the policy area in question, but also depends on the degree of party political 
polarisation in the area in question: partisan influence on (polarised) education policy 
is greater than in childcare, where there has been some partisan convergence.  The 
picture of partisan influence varying according to policy sectors is confirmed by Wolf 
and Hildebrandt (2008, p. 364), who find it significant in education policy (both in 
schools and universities), policy towards the police and internal affairs, 
environmental policy, the use of direct-democratic instruments and to some degree 
in social policy (whereas in the case of fiscal policy, the partisan composition of the 
Land government is not influential).   
 
The suggestion that the specific character of a Land can exert a profound influence 
upon public policy at a regional level has also been confirmed here, and can 
sometimes ‘trump’ partisan influence, even in the field of education policy, where the 
latter is strong.  Regional-level path dependence can help us explain why 
comprehensive schools persisted in Hesse under Roland Koch, why attempts to 
extend non-selective education in Hamburg catastrophically failed, and why the 
eastern Länder have significantly higher levels of institutional childcare provision 
than those in the west.  Again, this confirms findings elsewhere: Wolf and 
Hildebrandt (ibid, p. 365) also see strong evidence for path dependency in such 
diverse areas as policy towards the police, local government, and economic policy.  
This path dependence manifests itself in formal institutional rules (once a particular 
policy is adopted into a Land’s constitution, it requires a super-majority to overturn it; 
the possibility of direct democratic instruments being used to obstruct policy change 
also exists now in most Länder).  It is also present in shaping attitudes, and in 
creating a concentration of interests which can then form interest groups to defend 
particular policy trajectories.  The notion of regional path dependence has long 
featured in the literature on economic geography, looking at why regions’ economic 
development trajectories vary (Martin / Sunley 2006).  The findings here suggest 
that, in the case of Germany (or any other polity which combines some territorial 
diversity with political decentralisation), the notion can usefully be deployed by 
scholars of political science and public policy to explain different patterns of 
development. 
 
Partisan and ‘territorial’ influences upon public policy do not exist in isolation from 
each other.  As has been demonstrated elsewhere (Schmid 1990, Detterbeck / 
Jeffery 2008 / Müller 2009), different Landesverbände of the same party can have 
substantially different policies.  Equally, the character of a Land will, to some extent, 
be shaped politically: for instance, the creation of comprehensive schools in Hesse 
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resulted not principally from the nature of the Land’s economy or social structure, but 
rather the decisions of SPD governments, in particular in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. 
Hepp / Weinacht 2003). 
 
Nothing in this article seeks to dispute the importance, and relevance of national-
level studies of public policy.  Undoubtedly, nation states remain an important unit of 
analysis for political scientists, and of course by and large nation states frame the 
constitutional and political context in which sub-national government operate.  The 
claim developed here is more modest: it is that partisan influence upon public policy, 
alongside territorial factors which can combine into a form of ‘path dependence’, can 
be readily identified on a regional level.  On the one hand, a complete picture of the 
development of public policy, especially in areas which are often decentralised, 
cannot be formed while neglecting the regional level.  On the other, political 
scientists may find the regional level a source of rich, accessible data with which to 
challenge and develop long-standing claims about the nature of policy change. 
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